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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic congestion games.
Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular,
we assume agents optimize a linear combination of personal delay of a strategy and the resulting
social cost. Our model can be embedded in the framework of congestion games with player-
specific latency functions. Stable states are the Nash equilibria of these games, and we examine
their existence and the convergence of sequential best-response dynamics. Previous work shows
that for symmetric singleton games with convex delays Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist.
For concave delay functions we observe that there are games without Nash equilibria and provide
a polynomial time algorithm to decide existence for symmetric singleton games with arbitrary
delay functions. Our algorithm can be extended to compute best and worst Nash equilibria
if they exist. For more general congestion games existence becomes NP-hard to decide, even
for symmetric network games with quadratic delay functions. Perhaps surprisingly, if all delay
functions are linear, then there is always a Nash equilibrium in any congestion game with
altruists and any better-response dynamics converges.
In addition to these results for uncoordinated dynamics, we consider a scenario in which a
central altruistic institution can motivate agents to act altruistically. We provide constructive
and hardness results for finding the minimum number of altruists to stabilize an optimal con-
gestion profile and more general mechanisms to incentivize agents to adopt favorable behavior.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic game theory has been focused on game-theoretic models for a variety of important
applications in the Internet, e.g. selfish routing [5, 8, 28], network creation [4], as well as aspects
of e-commerce [18] and social networks [16]. A fundamental assumption in these games, however,
is that all agents are selfish. Their goals are restricted to optimizing their direct personal benefit,
e.g. their personal delay in a routing game. The assumption of selfishness in the preferences of
agents is found in the vast majority of present work on economic aspects of the Internet. However,
this assumption has been repeatedly questioned by economists and psychologists. In experiments
it has been observed that participant behavior can be quite complex and contradictive to selfish-
ness [22,23]. Various explanations have been given for this phenomenon, e.g. senses of fairness [12],
reciprocity among agents [17], or spite and altruism [10,23].
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Prominent developments in the Internet like Wikipedia, open source software development, or
Web 2.0 applications involve or explicitly rely on voluntary participation and contributions towards
a joint project without direct personal benefit. These examples display forms of altruism, in which
agents accept certain personal burdens (e.g. by investing time, attention, and money) to improve a
common outcome. While malicious behavior has been considered recently for instance in nonatomic
routing [6,7,21], virus incoulation [25], or bayesian congestion games [14], a deeper analysis of the
effects of altruistic agents on competitive dynamics in algorithmic game theory is still missing.
We consider and analyze a model of altruism inspired by Ledyard [22, p. 154], and recently
studied for non-atomic routing games by Chen and Kempe [7]. Each agent i is assumed to be partly
selfish and partly altruistic. Her incentive is to optimize a linear combination of personal cost and
social cost, given by the sum of cost values of all agents. The strength of altruism of each agent i
is captured by her altruism level βi ∈ [0, 1], where βi = 0 results in a purely selfish and βi = 1 in a
purely altruistic agent.
Chen and Kempe [7] proved that in non-atomic routing games Nash equilibria are always guar-
anteed to exist, even for partially spiteful users, and analyzed the price of anarchy for parallel link
networks. In our paper, we conduct the first study of altruistic agents in atomic congestion games, a
well-studied model for resource sharing. A standard congestion game is given by a set N of myopic
selfish users and a set E of resources. Each resource e has a non-decreasing delay function de. Every
agent i can pick a strategy Si from a set of possible strategies Si ⊆ 2E , which means she allocates
the set Si of resources (e.g. a path in a network). She then experiences a delay corresponding to
the total delay on all resources in Si, which in turn depends on the number of agents that allocate
each resource. Each agent strives to pick a strategy minimizing her experienced delay. A stable
state in such a game is a pure Nash equilibrium, in which each agent picks exactly one strategy,
and no agent can decrease her delay by unilaterally changing her strategy. The study of congestion
games received a lot of attention in recent years, mostly because of the intuitive formulation and
their appealing analytical properties. In particular, they always possess a pure Nash equilibrium
and every sequential better-response dynamics converges.
As one might expect, the presence of altruists can significantly alter the convergence and exis-
tence guarantees of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games. After a formal definition of congestion
games with altruists in Section 2, we concentrate on pure equilibria and leave a study of mixed
Nash equilibria for future work. Our results are as follows.
It is a simple exercise to observe that even in a singleton game, in which each strategy consists of
a single resource, and for symmetric agents, where each agent has the same set of strategies, a Nash
equilibrium can be absent. This is the case even for pure altruists and egoists, i.e. a population of
agents which are either purely altruistic or purely selfish and their βi ∈ {0, 1}. However, we show
in Section 3 that such games admit a polynomial time algorithm to decide the existence problem.
Furthermore, our algorithm can be adapted to compute the Nash equilibrium with best and worst
social cost if it exists, for any agent population with a constant number of different altruism levels.
For slightly more general asymmetric singleton games, in which strategy spaces of agents differ,
we show in Section 3 that deciding the existence of Nash equilibria becomes NP-hard. Nevertheless,
for the important subclass of convex delay functions, previous results imply that for any agent
population a Nash equilibrium exists and can be obtained in polynomial time. In contrast, we show
in Section 4 that convexity of delay functions is not sufficient for more general games. In particular,
even for symmetric network games, in which strategies represent paths through a network, quadratic
delay functions and pure altruists, Nash equilibria can be absent and deciding their existence is
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NP-hard. Perhaps surprisingly, if all delay functions are linear, then there is a potential function.
Thus, for every agent population Nash equilibria exist and better-response dynamics converges.
In addition to these results for uncoordinated dynamics, in Section 5 we consider a slightly more
coordinated scenario, in which there is a central institution striving to obtain a good outcome. An
obvious way to induce favorable behavior is to convince agents to act altruistically. In this context
a natural question is how many altruists are required to stabilize a social optimum. This has
been considered under the name “price of optimum” in [20] for Stackelberg routing in nonatomic
congestion games. As a Nash equilibrium in atomic games is not necessarily unique, we obtain two
measures - an optimal stability threshold, which is the minimum number of altruists such that there
is any optimal Nash equilibrium, and an optimal anarchy threshold, which asks for the minimum
number of altruists such that every Nash equilibrium is optimal. For symmetric singleton games,
we adapt our algorithm for computing Nash equilibria to determine both thresholds in polynomial
time.
In our model the optimal anarchy threshold might not be well-defined even for singleton games.
If all agents are altruists, there are suboptimal local optima in symmetric games with concave
delays, or in asymmetric games with linear delays. Hence, even by making all agents altruists,
the worst Nash equilibrium sometimes remains suboptimal. In contrast, we adapt the idea of the
optimal stability threshold to a very general scenario, in which we can find a stable state with a
given, not necessarily optimal, congestion profile. Each agent has a personalized stability cost for
accepting a strategy under the given congestions. We provide an incentive compatible mechanism
to determine an allocation of agents to strategies with minimum total stability cost. Unfortunately,
such a general result is restricted to the case of singleton games. Even for symmetric network games
on series-parallel graphs, we show that the problem of determining the optimal stability threshold
is NP-hard.
2 Model and Initial Results
We consider congestion games with altruists. A congestion game with altruists G is given by a set
N of n agents and a set E of m resources. Each agent i has a set Si ⊆ 2E of strategies. In a
singleton congestion game each agent has only singleton strategies Si ⊆ E. A vector of strategies
S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is called a state. For a state we denote by ne the congestion, i.e. the number of
agents using a resource e in their strategy. Each resource e has a latency or delay function de(ne),
and the delay for an agent i playing Si in state S is di(S) =
∑
e∈Si de(ne). The social cost of a
state is the total delay of all agents c(S) =
∑
i∈N
∑
e∈Si de(ne) =
∑
e∈E nede(ne). Each agent i has
an altruism level of βi ∈ [0, 1], and her individual cost is ci(S) = βic(S) + (1− βi)di(S). We call an
agent i an egoist if βi = 0 and a βi-altruist otherwise. A (pure) altruist has βi = 1, a (pure) egoist
has βi = 0. A game G with only pure altruists and egoists is a game, in which βi ∈ {0, 1} for all
i ∈ N . A game G is said to have β-uniform altruists if βi = β ∈ [0, 1] for every agent i ∈ N . A
(pure) Nash equilibrium is a state S, in which no agent i can unilaterally decrease her individual
cost by unilaterally changing her strategy. We exclusively consider pure equilibria in this paper.
If all agents are egoists, the game is a regular congestion game, which has an exact potential
function Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
∑ne
x=1 de(x) [27]. Thus, existence of Nash equilibria and convergence of
iterative better-response dynamics are guaranteed. Obviously, if all agents are altruists, Nash equi-
libria correspond to local optima of the social cost function c with respect to a local neighborhood
consisting of single player strategy changes. Hence, existence and convergence are also guaranteed.
3
This directly implies the same properties for β-uniform games, in which an exact potential function
is Φβ(S) = (1− β)Φ(S) + βc(S).
In general, however, Nash equilibria might not exist.
Observation 1. There are symmetric singleton congestion games with only pure altruists and
egoists without a Nash equilibrium.
Example 2. Consider a game with two resources e and f , three egoists and one (pure) altruist.
The delay functions are de(x) = df (x) with de(1) = 4, de(2) = 8, de(3) = 9, and de(4) = 11.
Then, in equilibrium each resource must be allocated by at least one egoist. In case there are two
agents on each resource, the social cost is 32. In this case the altruist is motivated to change as
the resulting cost is 31. In that case, however, one of the egoists on the resource with congestion 3
has an incentive to change. Thus, no Nash equilibrium will evolve.
Our interest is thus to characterize the games that have Nash equilibria. Towards this end we
observe that an altruistic congestion game can be cast as a congestion game with player-specific
latency functions [24]. For simplicity consider a game with only pure altruists and egoists. An
altruist moves from Si to S′i if the decrease in total delay nede(ne) on the resources e ∈ Si− S′i she
is leaving exceeds the increase on resources e ∈ S′i − Si she is migrating to. Hence, altruists can be
seen as myopic selfish agents with ci(S) = d′i(S) =
∑
e∈Si d
′
e(ne) with d
′
e(ne) = nede(ne) − (ne −
1)de(ne − 1), for ne > 0. We set d′e(0) = 0. Naturally, a βi-altruist corresponds to a selfish agent
with player-specific function ci(S) = (1 − βi)di(S) + βid′i(S). Thus, our games can be embedded
into the class of player-specific congestion games. For some classes of these games it is known that
Nash equilibria always exist. In particular, non-existence in Example 2 is due to the fact that the
individual delay function for the altruist is not monotone. Monotonicity holds, in particular, if
delay functions are convex. In this case, it is known that for matroid games, in which the strategy
space of each agent is a matroid, existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed [2].
Corollary 3. [2, 24] For any matroid congestion game with altruists and convex delay functions
a Nash equilibrium exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
3 Singleton Congestion Games
In the previous section we have seen that there are symmetric singleton congestion games with
only pure altruists and egoists with and without Nash equilibria. For this class of games we can
decide the existence of Nash equilibria in polynomial time. In addition, we can compute a Nash
equilibrium with minimum and maximum social cost if they exist.
Theorem 4. For symmetric singleton games with only pure altruists and egoists there is a poly-
nomial time algorithm to decide if a Nash equilibrium exists and to compute the best and the worst
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first tackle the existence problem and present an approach similar to [19] based on
dynamic programming. Suppose we are given a game G with the set N0 of n0 egoists and the set
N1 of n1 = n − n0 altruists. For a state S consider the set of resources E0 =
⋃
i∈N0 Si on which
at least one egoist is located. The maximum delay of any resource on which an egoist is located is
denoted dmax0 = maxe∈E0 de(ne) and minimum delay of any resource if an additional agent is added
dmin+0 = mine∈E de(ne + 1). Similarly, consider the set of resources E1 =
⋃
i∈N1 Si. The maximum
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altruistic delay of any resource, on which an altruist is located, is denoted dmax1 = maxe∈E1 d′e(ne)
and the minimum altruistic delay of any resource dmin+1 = mine∈E d
′
e(ne + 1). A state is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if
dmax0 ≤ dmin+0 and dmax1 ≤ dmin+1 . (1)
This condition yields a separation property. Consider a Nash equilibrium, in which nE′,0 egoists
and nE′,1 altruists are located on a subset E′ ⊂ E of resources. The Nash equilibrium respects the
inequalities above for certain values dmax0/1 and d
min+
0/1 . Note that it is possible to completely change
the assignment of agents in E′. If the new assignment respects the inequalities for the same values,
it can be combined with the assignment on E − E′ and again a Nash equilibrium evolves.
This property suggests the following approach to search for an equilibrium. Suppose the values
for dmax0/1 and d
min+
0/1 are given. Our algorithm adds resources e one by one and tests the possible
numbers of egoists and altruists that can be assigned to e. Suppose we have processed the resources
from a subset E′ and have found the numbers of altruists and egoists, for which there is an assign-
ment to resources E′ such that there is no violation of equations (1) for the given delay values. In
this case, we know the feasible numbers of altruists and egoists that are left to be assigned to the
remaining resources. Suppose we have marked these combinations of remaining agents in a boolean
matrix R of size (n0 + 1) × (n1 + 1). Here rij = 1 if and only if there is a feasible assignment
of n0 − i egoists and n1 − j altruists to E′. For the new resource e we now test all combinations
(ne,0, ne,1) of altruists and egoists that can be allocated to e such that the equations (1) remain
fulfilled. We then compile a new matrix R′ of the feasible combinations of remaining agents for the
remaining resources E − E′ − {e}. In particular, for each tuple (ne,0, ne,1) and each positive entry
rij of R we check if i − ne,0 ≥ 0 and j − ne,1 ≥ 0. If this holds, we set the entry of R′ with index
(i− ne,0, j − ne,1) to 1. If e is the last resource to be processed, we check if the resulting matrix R′
has a positive entry r′0,0 = 1. In this case a Nash equilibrium exists for the given values of dmax{0,1} and
dmin+{0,1} , otherwise it does not exist. Due to the separation property mentioned above, this approach
succeeds to implicitly test all allocations that fulfill equations (1) for the given values. Finally, note
that there are only at most O(n20n
2
1m
4) possible values for which we must run the algorithm.
The separation property mentioned above also applies to the best or worst Nash equilibrium. In
particular, consider the best Nash equilibrium S that respects (1) for some fixed values dmax{0,1} and
dmin+{0,1} . Consider any subset of resources E
′ with a number nE′,0 and nE′,1 of egoists and altruists,
respectively. S is the cheapest Nash equilibrium that respects (1) for the given values if and only
if the assignment of S in E′ is the cheapest assignment with nE′,0 egoists and nE′,1 altruists that
respects (1) for the values. Thus, we can adjust our approach as follows. For a set E′ of processed
resources, instead of simply noting in rij that there is a feasible assignment to E′ that leaves i egoists
and j altruists, we can remember the social cost of the cheapest of such assignments. Thus, the
matrix R is then a matrix of positive entries, for which we use a prohibitively large cost to identify
infeasible combinations. When we compile a new matrix R′ after testing all feasible assignments
to a new resource e, we can denote in each entry the minimum cost that can be obtained for
the respective combination. A similar argument works for computing the worst Nash equilibrium.
This decides the existence question and finds the cost values of best and worst Nash equilibria. By
tracing back the steps of the algorithm we can also discover the strategy choices of agents.
Note that the previous proof can be extended to a constant number k of different altruism
levels. In this more general scenario we choose the delay parameters for each level of altruists.
5
For each resource e we then test all possible combinations of agents from the different levels that
we can allocate to a resource e and satisfy all bounds. The matrix R changes in dimension to
(nβ1 + 1)× . . .× (nβk + 1) to account for all feasible combinations of remaining agents. Finally, we
need to test all combinations of delay bounds. However, if k is constant, all these operations can
be done in polynomial time.
Corollary 5. For symmetric singleton games with altruists and a constant number of different
altruism levels, there is a polynomial time algorithm to decide if a Nash equilibrium exists and to
compute the best and the worst Nash equilibrium.
As a byproduct, our approach also allows us to compute a social optimum state in polynomial
time. We simply assume all agents to be pure altruists and compute the best Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 6. For symmetric singleton congestion games a social optimum state can be obtained
in polynomial time.
In case of asymmetric games, however, deciding the existence of Nash equilibria becomes sig-
nificantly harder.
Theorem 7. It is NP-hard to decide if a singleton congestion game with only pure altruists and
egoists has a Nash equilibrium if G is asymmetric and has concave delay functions.
Proof. We reduce from 3Sat. Given a formula ϕ, we construct a congestion game Gϕ that has a
Nash equilibrium if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. Let x1, . . . , xn denote the variables and c1, . . . , cm
the clauses of a formula ϕ. Without loss of generality [30], we assume each variable appears at
most twice positively and at most twice negatively.
For each variable xi there is a selfish agent Xi that chooses one of the resources e1xi , e
0
xi , or
e0. The resources e1xi and e
0
xi have the delay function 9x and resource e0 has the delay function
7x + 3. For each clause cj , there is a selfish agent Cj who can choose one of the following three
resources. For every positive literal xi in cj he may choose e0xi . For every negated literal x¯i in cj he
may choose e1xi . Note that there is a stable configuration with no variable agent on e0 if and only
if there is a satisfiable assignment for ϕ. Additionally, there are three selfish agents u1, u2, and u3
who can choose e1 or e2. Each of the resources e1 and e2 has delay 4 if used by one agent, delay 8
if used by two agents and delay 9 otherwise. The only pure altruist u0 chooses between e1, e2, and
e0. Note that the altruist chooses e1, e2 if one of the variable agents is on e0.
If ϕ is satisfiable by a bitvector (x∗1, . . . , x∗n), a stable solution for Gϕ can be obtained by placing
each variable agent xi on e
x∗i
xi . Since (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) satisfies ϕ there is one resource for each clause
agent that is not used by a variable agent. Thus, we can place each clause agent on this resource,
which he then shares with at most one other clause agent. Let the altruist u0 use e0 and u1 and
u2 choose e1 and u3 choose e2. It is easy to check that this is a Nash equilibrium.
If ϕ is unsatisfiable, there is no stable solution. To prove this it suffices to show that one of the
variable agents prefers e0. In that case the altruist never chooses e0 and the agent u0, . . . , u3 play
the sub game of Example 2. For the purpose of contradiction assume that ϕ is not satisfiable but
there is a stable solution in which no variable wants to choose e0. This implies that there is no
other agent, i.e. a clause agent, on a resource that is used by a variable agent. However, if all clause
agents are on a resource without a variable agent we can derive a corresponding bit assignment
which, by construction, satisfies ϕ.
Therefore, Gϕ has a stable solution if and only if ϕ is satisfiable.
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sx1
e0
s0
s2
e7
e5 e6
e2 e3
e1
s1 e4
e10
e8
e1xn
e0xnsxn
e9
e0x1
e1x1
...
t0
s′
...
scj
e7
s
Figure 1: The structure of the network of GΦ (solid edges
only) and G′Φ.
Edge delay function
e0 7x+ 3
e1 2
e2 17
e4 2.4x2
e6 x
2
e10 18.5
e1xi ,e
1
xi 9x
(s, sxi) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n Mx
(s, scj ) ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m Mx
(s, s1), (s, s2), (s, s′) Mx
(s, s0) (n+m+ 5)M
(t0, t) (n+m+ 5)M
(t′, t) Mx
Table 1: The delay functions on the
edges of GΦ and G′Φ. Edges that are
not listed here have delay of 0.
4 General Games
For any singleton game G with altruists and convex delay functions a Nash equilibrium always
exists. For more general network structures, we show that convexity of delay functions is not
sufficient. In particular, this holds even for games with only pure altruists and egoists in the case
in which almost all delay functions are linear of the form de(x) = aex, except for two edges, which
have quadratic delay functions de(x) = aex2. For simplicity, we use some edges with non-convex
constant delay be. We can replace these edges by sufficiently many parallel edges with delay bex.
This transformation is of polynomial size and yields an equivalent game with only convex delays.
Theorem 8. It is NP-hard to decide if a symmetric network congestion game with only pure
altruists and egoists and quadratic delay functions has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first reduce from 3Sat to asymmetric congestion games. Again, we assume each variable
appears at most twice positively and at most twice negatively. In a second step, we show that the
resulting congestion games can be turned into symmetric games while preserving all necessary
properties.
Our reduction is similar to the construction that we used in the proof of Theorem 7. The
structure of the resulting network congestion game GΦ is depicted in Figure 1.
Each agent Xi chooses one of three paths from his source node sxi to his target node t
′ and
therefore uses exactly one of the edges e0xi , e
1
xi , or e0. Each clause agent Cj uses a path from scj to
t′ and uses one of the three edges as described in the proof of Theorem 7. That is, for each positive
literal xi in cj he may choose a path that includes the edge e0xi . For every negated literal x¯i in cj
he may choose a path that contains the edge e1xi .
There is a selfish agent u1 that chooses a path from s1 to t′ and two selfish agents u2 and u3
that allocate the path from s2 to t′. Finally, one altruistic agent u0 chooses a path from s0 to t0.
As in the proof of Theorem 7, we can conclude that there is a variable agent whose best response
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includes edge e0 if and only if Φ is not satisfiable. If no variable agent is on e0, a Nash equilibrium
can be obtained by placing u1 on the path that begins with (e1, e0). For agent u0 it is optimal to
choose the path (e8, e6, e3).
However, if at least one variable agent is on the edge e0, there is no Nash equilibrium. If the
altruist u0 is on the path (e8, e6, e3), the best response for u1 is the path (e4, e5, e6, e7). If u1 is the
path (e4, e5, e6, e7), the best response for the altruist u0 is path (e7, e4, e2). If u0 is on (e7, e4, e2),
the best response for u1 is the path that begins with the edge e10. This, finally, is a state in which
the best response for u0 is (e8, e6, e3). Thus, the constructed network congestion game GΦ has a
Nash equilibrium if and only if the formula Φ is satisfiable.
Now, we turn the asymmetric network congestion game GΦ into a symmetric congestion game
G′Φ. We add a new source node s, a new target node t and a node s
′ to the network and connect
them to GΦ as depicted by the dashed edges in Figure 1. Note that M is an integer that is larger
than the sum of possible delay values in GΦ. If all agents play their best responses, then we can
observe the following: Each outgoing edge of s′ is used by exactly one selfish agent and the altruist
chooses a path that begins with the edge (s, s0). Every best response path of a selfish agent finishes
with the edge (t′, t). Every best response path of the altruist ends with the edge (t0, t). Therefore,
G′Φ has a Nash equilibrium if and only if GΦ has a Nash equilibrium.
Perhaps surprisingly, if every delay function is linear de(x) = aex + be, then an elegant com-
bination of the Rosenthal potential and the social cost function yields a potential for arbitrary
βi-altruists. Hence, existence of Nash equilibria and convergence of sequential better-response dy-
namics is always guaranteed. The proof is carefully constructed for altruists, as for congestion
games with general player-specific linear latency functions a potential does not exist [15]. We only
consider delays de(x) = aex without offset be, but as noted earlier, this is not a restriction.
Theorem 9. For any congestion game with altruists and linear delay functions there is always a
Nash equilibrium and sequential better-response dynamics converges.
Proof. The theorem follows from the existence of a weighted potential Φ that decreases during
every improvement step of any agent i with altruism level βi.
Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
ne∑
j=1
aej +
∑
e∈E
aen
2
e −
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈Si
2βi − 1
βi + 1
ae
Consider a state S and an improving strategy change of an agent i from Si to S′i resulting
in a strategy profile S′. We show that Φ decreases. For the sake of clarity and brevity we set
∆N =
∑
e∈Si\S′i aene−
∑
e∈S′i\Si ae(ne+ 1) and ∆C =
∑
e∈Si\S′i(2aene−ae)−
∑
e∈S′i\Si(2aene+ae).
Note that an improving strategy change requires (1− β) ∆N + β∆C > 0.
Φ(S)− Φ(S′) = ∆N + ∆C −
∑
e∈Si\S′i
2βi − 1
βi + 1
ae +
∑
e∈S′i\Si
2βi − 1
βi + 1
ae
=
(
1− 2(2βi − 1)
1 + βi
)
∆N + ∆C +
2(2βi − 1)
1 + βi
∆N −
∑
e∈S\S′i
2βi − 1
βi + 1
ae +
∑
e∈S′i\S
2βi − 1
βi + 1
ae
=
(
1− 2(2βi − 1)
1 + βi
)
∆N + ∆C +
(2βi − 1)
1 + βi
∆C
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=
3− 3βi
1 + βi
∆N +
3βi
1 + βi
∆C =
3
1 + βi
((1− βi) ∆N + βi∆C) > 0
Unfortunately, it follows directly from previous work [11] that the number of iterations to reach
a Nash equilibrium can be exponential, and the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium is PLS-
hard. For regular congestion games with matriod strategy spaces [1] Nash dynamics converge in
polynomial time. It is an interesting open problem if a similar result holds here.
5 Stabilization Methods
This section treats a model in which an institution can convince selfish agents to act as altruists.
For simplicity of presentation we first restrict to games with only pure altruists and egoists. A
natural question for such an institution to consider is how many altruists are required to guarantee
that there is a Nash equilibrium with a certain cost, e.g. a Nash equilibrium as cheap as a social
optimum state. A similar question has been considered for Stackelberg routing in the Wardrop
model [20,29]. We term this number the optimal stability threshold. In a more pessimistic direction
it is of interest to determine the minimum number of altruists needed to guarantee that the worst-
case Nash equilibrium is optimal. We term this number the optimal anarchy threshold. Let us denote
by n+1 and n
−
1 the optimal stability and anarchy threshold, respectively. As a consequence from
Theorem 4 we can compute both numbers for symmetric singleton congestion games in polynomial
time. For each number of altruists we check if the best and/or worst Nash equilibrium is as cheap
as the social optimum.
Corollary 10. For symmetric singleton congestion games with only pure altruists and egoists there
is a polynomial time algorithm to compute n+1 and n
−
1 .
Note that the optimal anarchy threshold is not well-defined, because the worst Nash equilibrium
might always be suboptimal, even for a population of altruists only. In case of symmetric singleton
games and convex delay functions, an easy exchange argument serves to show that in this case
any local optimum is also a global optimum. However, for concave delay functions or asymmetric
singleton games, a local optimum might still be globally suboptimal.1 Note that for symmetric
games, our algorithm is able to detect the cases in which suboptimal local optima exist. In the
asymmetric case, however, a similar approach fails, because of the NP-hardness of determining
existence of a Nash equilibrium. Thus, in the following we concentrate on the optimal stability
threshold.
In asymmetric games, it is also required to determine the identity of agents, so here we strive
to find a set (denoted N+e ) of minimum cardinality. For an optimal set of congestion values
n∗E = (n
∗
e)e∈E we can determine N
+
1 (n
∗
E) such that there is a Nash equilibrium of the game with
congestion values n∗e for all e ∈ E.
Theorem 11. For singleton games with only pure altruists and egoists and a social optimal con-
gestion vector n∗E there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute N
+
1 (n
∗
E).
1Consider a symmetric game with two resources, d1(1) = 16, d1(2) = 32, d1(3) = 36, and d2(x) = 45. If all agents
allocate resource 1, we get a Nash equilibrium of cost 108. In the optimum two agents allocate resource 2 resulting
in a cost of 106. Now consider an asymmetric game with three resources and delay functions d1(x) = d2(x) = 8x,
and d3(x) = 4x. Agent 1 can use resources 1 and 2, agents 2 and 3 can use resources 2 and 3. The state (2, 3, 3) is a
Nash equilibrium of cost 32, while the social optimum is a state (1, 2, 3) of cost 20.
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Proof. Suppose we are given a congestion vector (n∗e)e∈E that results in minimum social cost. We
now construct a weighted bipartite graph as follows. One partition is the set of agent N . In the
other partition we introduce for each resource e a number of n∗e vertices. If e ∈ Si we connect
agent i to all vertices that were introduced due to e. If e represents a best-response for i, then we
assign a weight of 0 to all corresponding edges between i and the vertices of e. To all other edges
we assign a weight of 1. Note that any feasible allocation of agents to strategies that generates the
congestion vector n∗e is represented by a perfect matching. Due to social optimality an altruist can
be matched with any strategy, while an egoist must be matched to a best response. If we match
an agent to a strategy, which is not a best-response, it thus has to become an altruist and a weight
of one is counted towards the weight of the matching. By computing a minimum weight perfect
matching [9], we can identify a minimal set N+1 (n
∗
E) of altruists required.
Observe that by creating the edges of cost 1 only to strategies which represent best-responses
with respect to the altruistic delay d′, we can compute N+1 (nE) for arbitrary congestion vectors nE .
In this case, the set might be empty, if e.g. the congestion vector corresponds to a very expensive
state and can never be generated by a Nash equilibrium for any distribution of altruists. This case,
however, can be recognized by the absence of a perfect matching in the bipartite graph.
This approach turns out to be applicable to an even more general natural scenario. Suppose
each agent i has a stability cost cie for each strategy e ∈ Si. This cost yields the disutility for being
forced to play a certain strategy given a congestion vector nE . In this scenario we slightly change
N∗1 (nE) to the set agents of minimal stability cost. Still, we can compute this set by a minimum
weight perfect matching if we set the weights to cie for all edges connecting i to vertices of e. The
stability cost allows for general preferences exceeding categories like altruists and egoists.
Corollary 12. For singleton games and a congestion vector nE there is a polynomial time algorithm
to compute N+1 (nE) with minimal stability cost.
The underlying problem can be seen as a slot allocation to agents. As the computed allocation
has minimal stability cost, it is possible to turn the algorithm into a truthful mechanism using
VCG payments (see e.g. [26, chapter 9]). Our final mechanism (1) learns the stability costs from
each agent, (2) determines the allocation, and (3) pays appropriate amounts to agents for truthful
revelation of cost values and adaptation of allocated strategies. In addition, it can be verified that
all computations needed require only polynomial time.
Corollary 13. For singleton games and a congestion vector nE there is a truthful VCG-mechanism
to compute N+1 (nE) in polynomial time.
These general results are restricted to the case of singleton games. For more general games we
show that it is NP-hard to decide if there is a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the social optimum.
Our next theorem establishes this even for symmetric network congestion games with linear delays,
in which an arbitrary Nash equilibrium and a social optimum state can be computed in polynomial
time [11]. Furthermore, the result requires only a series-parallel network. Thus, even in this
restricted case it is NP-hard to decide if the number n+1 of pure altruists required is 0 or 1, or
equivalently if N+1 (n
∗
E) is empty or not.
Theorem 14. For symmetric network congestion games with 3 agents, linear delay functions
on series-parallel graphs and optimal congestions n∗E it is NP-hard to decide if there is a Nash
equilibrium with congestions n∗E.
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Proof. We reduce from Partition. Let an instance be given by positive integers a1, . . . , ak and
a =
∑k
i=1 ai, where a is an even number. Create a network with two nodes and two parallel edges
e1 and e2 for each integer ai. The delay de1(x) = 2aix, and de2(x) = aix. All these networks are
concatenated sequentially. We denote the first node of this path gadget by u and the last by v. In
addition, we add one edge f = (u, v) with delay df (x) = 34ax. Finally, the game has three egoists,
which need to allocate a path from u to v.
The unique social optimum is to let one agent use f and the other two agents use two edge-
disjoint paths through the path gadget. This yields an optimal social cost of 154 a. However, for a
Nash equilibrium each path through the gadget must not have more delay than 32a. If the instance
of Partition is solvable, then the elements assigned to a partition represent the edges of type e1
that an agent allocates in Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, if the instance is not solvable, there is no
possibility to partition the path gadget into two edge-disjoint paths of latency at most 32a.
The reduction works for a small constant number of agents but only shows weak NP-hardness. If
the number of agents is variable, it is possible to show strong NP-hardness with a similar reduction
from 3-Partition.
We remark that the previous theorem contrasts the continuous non-atomic case, in which a
minimal fraction of altruistic demand stabilizing an optimum solution can be computed in any
symmetric network congestion game [20].
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have initiated the study of altruists in atomic congestion games. Our model
is similar to the one presented by Chen and Kempe [7] for nonatomic routing games, however,
we observe quite different properties. In the nonatomic case, existence of Nash equilibria for any
population of agents is always guaranteed, even if agents are partially spiteful. In contrast, our
study answers fundamental questions for existence and convergence in atomic games. For the case of
linear latencies, an elegant combination of social cost and the Rosenthal potential proves guaranteed
existence and convergence. The next step is to consider the price of anarchy and the relations to
results on Stackelberg games [13]. An altruistic variant of the price of malice [3,25] measuring the
influence of altruists on the worst-case Nash equilibrium can be interesting to consider. Finally, a
characterization of games for which Nash equilibria exist and best-response dynamics converge (in
polynomial time) is an important open problem.
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